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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, we develop a Bayesian updating model that estimates the location 
and time of a chemical attack using inputs from chemical sensors and Atmospheric 
Threat and Dispersion (ATD) models. In bridging the critical gap between raw sensor 
data and threat evaluation and prediction, the model will help authorities perform better 
hazard prediction and damage control.  
The model is evaluated with respect to settings representing real-world 
operations. Factors that affect the model’s capability to accurately estimate the location 
and time of an attack are (i) the specific layout of the deployed sensors relative to the 
attack location; (ii) the number of false positive signals; and (iii) the number of false 
negative errors. An experimental design is used to evaluate the model against the factors 
identified. The dominant factor is the Expected Number of Correct Signals (ENCS), 
which depends on the specific layout of the deployed sensors relative to the attack 
location. From analyzing the effect of sensitivity (absence of false negative errors) and 
specificity (absence of false positive errors) of the sensors deployed, we conclude that it 
is more worthwhile to invest in sensitivity than specificity.  We also obtain insights on 
sensor coverage. 
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In the aftermath of the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, and the 
international anthrax and Sarin nerve gas scare, it has become clear that no reliable 
method currently exists to protect ordinary citizens from chemical and biological agents 
that are dispersed in the air. The challenge involves both the detection and identification 
of possible contamination sources in the shortest time possible. Therefore, a goal of 
paramount importance for international security agencies is to infer in near real-time the 
existence of an air-contaminating event; to determine its source location and time of 
release, and subsequently to respond effectively to the attack. Sensor systems capable of 
simultaneously monitoring the concentrations of multiple, related air-borne toxins have 
been and are continually being developed. However, there are only very few methods that 
are capable of utilizing sensor information in real-time for identifying the source and time 
of release for a contamination event. (Bagtzoglou et al., 2004) 
In this thesis, we develop a Bayesian updating model that estimates the location 
and time of a single chemical attack using inputs from chemical sensors and Atmospheric 
Threat and Dispersion (ATD) models. In bridging the critical gap between raw sensor 
data and threat evaluation and prediction, the model will help authorities perform better 
hazard prediction and damage control.  
There are two time scales used in the model. The attack time scale, denoted by the 
index t, represents the time horizon during which a chemical attack can be detected. This 
time horizon is finite and we assume that it is of length T. The detection time scale, 
denoted by the index u, represents the current time in which updates are received from 
the sensors and probability maps are generated. The attack time scale runs backwards 
relative to the current time in the detection time scale. 
The model is made up of 3 modules: i) a physical model, ii) a sensor model and 
iii) a Bayesian updating model. The physical model serves to calculate the chemical 
concentration c at the location of sensor s due to an attack at location l, t time periods 
ago. Based on the output c of the physical model, the sensor model computes the 
 xiv
probability , ( )
s
l tP c  that a sensor located at location s detects a chemical attack at location 
l, that occurred t time periods ago. The Bayesian updating model calculates the 
probability map at time period u, ,
u
l t , of the posterior probability of a chemical attack at 
location l, t time period ago after an observation at time u. A high value of ,
u
l t  at time 
period u indicates that there is a strong likelihood that a chemical attack occurred at 
location l, t time periods ago. 
The model is implemented and evaluated with respect to settings representing real 
world operations. The selected alarm criterion, whereby decision makers initiate a 
response, is three consecutive time periods during which the posterior probabilities ,
u
l t   
are above the alarm threshold of 0.7 for a particular attack at location l, t time periods 
ago. The alarm criterion is a combination of a probability threshold (0.7) and a 
persistence measure (3 consecutive periods) to avoid responding erroneously to low 
posterior probabilities on the one hand, and to sudden temporary spikes in the probability 
map due to false positive errors, on the other hand. 
The Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) used are: 
 Accurately identifying the source location; and 
 Accurately identifying the time of release. 
These MOEs are chosen due to their impact on operations. The source location 
and time of release serve as critical inputs to threat modeling and mitigation. In 
evaluating the effectiveness of the model through simulations, a success is declared only 
if both MOEs are met, that is, the model accurately identifies both location and time of 
the attack.  Thus, success percentage is defined as the percentage of simulation trials that 
produce a success over the total number of trials performed. 
Factors that affect the effectiveness of the model are the specific layout of the 
deployed sensors relative to the attack location, the number of false positive errors and 
the number of false negative errors. An experimental design is used to evaluate the effect 
of each factor. 
 xv
Performing linear regression on the simulation results, it is found that the 
dominant factor is the specific layout of the deployed sensors relative to the attack 
location. Also, not surprisingly, we obtain that false negative errors have higher impact 
on the success percentage than false positive errors.  
We demonstrate that given a deployment of 16 AP4C chemical point sensors, a 
hypothesized release of 50kg of the Sarin (nerve gas) is accurately identified with high 
probability for several attack locations. The model bridges the critical gap between input 
of raw sensor data and the operational interpretation of these data, giving authorities the 
capability to perform better hazard prediction and damage control. 
 Insights on sensor coverage are also obtained by computing, using the ,
s
l tP  values, 
the probability that a certain attack location is detected by at least one sensor. This 
probability index allows decision makers and planners to identify both vulnerable areas 
and areas with no sensor coverage. For example, tradeoffs between coverage (e.g., 
placing sensors downwind) and timeliness (delayed warnings) could be explored. 
Future research involves extending the model to (i) detect chemical attacks with 
different nominal attack quantity levels, (ii) detect multiple chemical attacks and (iii) 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Knowing how to exploit the potential of technology will help us to create 
new solutions to deal with emerging security challenges. The increasing 
sophistication of IT systems now makes it possible to conduct complex 
analysis of massive amounts of data. Data mining, link-analysis 
technologies and sophisticated intelligent systems can help to provide us 
with early indications of threats and opportunities. 
Professor S. Jayakumar, 
      Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security 
and Minister for Law, Singapore, 27 March 2007 
A. BACKGROUND 
The risk of a chemical attack on the civilian population is low but real. In 1995, 
Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult, carried out a chemical attack, using Sarin gas, on the 
Tokyo subway lines. The attack killed 12 and injured over 3000 people, of which some 
500 were hospitalized. Dealing with such attacks in Singapore requires a total effort 
involving several Ministries, as well as the private sector and Singaporeans at large. 
(Rajah, 1995) 
To minimize the damage caused by a chemical attack on the civilian population, 
the location and time of the attack are needed for an effective response. The location of 
the attack will allow first responders to quickly quench the source in accordance to 
decontamination procedures, preventing the spread of the chemical agent. Moreover, the 
time and location of the attack are critical inputs to Atmospheric Threat Dispersion 
(ATD) models that predict the spread of the chemical plume. Information on the spread 
of the chemical plume allows security and defense authorities to make decisions on sites 
regarding decontamination and preventing cross-contamination, and to provide advice to 
the civilian population via the public warning system to undertake appropriate protective 
measures. 
In the event of a covert chemical attack, very little may be known about the 
source, perhaps not even its location. The best the authorities may have are reports of 
people becoming incapacitated, the existence of traffic pile-ups at several nearby 
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locations, or an isolated sensor raising an alarm. Such an undetected attack will delay 
actions to contain the chemical threat and provide early warning to the public. Absent 
early warning, the attack will inflict maximum damage leading to a high number of 
casualties and a large area of chemical contamination. Thus it is crucial to be able to 
detect the attack as soon as possible.  
Sensor systems capable of simultaneously monitoring the concentrations of 
Chemical, Biological, Radiology, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) threats are available 
and continually developed commercially. However, methods that are capable of utilizing 
the sensor information in real-time for identifying the source and time of release for a 
contamination event are in a research stage. Thus there are no commercial solutions 
available to the operational users and decision makers today. Despite the millions of 
dollars that are spent on chemical sensors in chemical defense, they currently only 
perform the role of detecting and monitoring the development of a chemical threat. 
Information of the time and location of the chemical attack remains largely unknown. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the aftermath of the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001 and the 
international anthrax and Sarin nerve gas scare, it has become clear that no reliable 
method currently exists to protect ordinary citizens from chemical and biological agents 
that are dispersed in the air. The challenge involves both the detection and identification 
of possible contamination sources in the shortest time possible. Therefore, a goal of 
paramount importance for security and response agencies is to infer in near real-time the 
existence of an air contaminating event, to determine its source location and time of 
release, and subsequently to respond effectively to the attack. Sensor systems capable of 
simultaneously monitoring the concentrations of multiple, related air-borne toxins have 
been and are continually being developed. However, methods that are capable of utilizing 
the sensor information in real-time for identifying the source and time of release for a 
contamination event do not exist. (Bagtzoglou et al., 2004) 
ATD models are physical models used to predict the spread of a certain chemical 
attack, taking into account terrain characteristics and prevailing meteorological 
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conditions. These models are used to perform hazard prediction and damage assessment 
of the detected threat for evacuation and mitigation. In the event of a covert chemical 
attack, security and defense ministries cannot leverage ATD models to provide 
information for evacuation and mitigation strategies because the information on the 
location and time of the attack are critical inputs of the models.  
In this thesis, we develop a model that estimates the location and time of a 
chemical attack using inputs from chemical sensors and ATD models. In bridging the 
critical gap between raw sensor data and threat evaluation and prediction, the model will 
help authorities perform better hazard prediction and damage control.  
C. APPROACH 
In developing a model for determining the location and time of a chemical 
release, two main areas of uncertainty need to be addressed: the time-dependent spatial 
distribution of the chemical plume and the probability of detecting the chemical agent, 
given that the plume is in the vicinity of the sensors. The first area of uncertainty is 
affected by the dispersion characteristics of the source, the terrain of the area of interest, 
source location, the release scenario (continuous or explosion), and meteorological 
effects. In this thesis we are only concerned with the source characteristics (type, strength 
and location), with the terrain chosen to be a flat land. The second area of uncertainty is 
associated with the capabilities of the sensors – their sensitivity (avoiding false negative 
errors) and specificity (avoiding false positive errors).  
The model is made up of 3 modules: i) a  physical model that describes the 
dispersion of the chemical plume; ii) a sensor model that reflects the uncertainty 
associated with sensor signals; and iii) a Bayesian updating model that generates a multi-




This research focuses on developing a model for detecting the occurrence of a 
chemical attack and determining its location and time of release from sensor data. The 
research questions addressed are: 
 Can we use a Bayesian updating model to develop a probability map of 
the location and time of a covert chemical attack? 
 How sensitive is the probability map with respect to sensor type, location 
and capabilities? 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized as follows:  
Chapter II reviews the various approaches used to develop algorithms for 
detecting the occurrence of a chemical attack, and determining its location, release rates 
and agent type from sensor data. The strengths and weaknesses of the approaches are 
briefly discussed.  Chapter III describes the development of the model and its three 
modules: (i) a physical (atmospheric) model of plume dispersion; (ii) a sensor model that 
reflects the detection capabilities of the sensor; and (iii) a Bayesian updating model that 
generates the probability map. Chapter IV present tests results of simulation runs 
performed for evaluating the effectiveness of the model in a small scale scenario in order 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of multiple sensors. The small scale test cases also serve 
as a preliminary check on the model integrity and implementation. Chapter V discusses 
the evaluation results of the model with respect to large scale settings that depict more 
closely real-world operations. The experimental design and analysis of the simulation 
runs with respect to the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are also discussed. Chapter 
VI draws conclusions relevant to the research questions posed. The chapter concludes by 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
In this chapter, we discuss the various approaches used to develop algorithms for 
the problem of detecting the occurrence of a chemical attack and determining its location, 
release rates, time of release and agent type from sensor data. This problem is henceforth 
called “Chemical Source Isolation.” The strengths and weaknesses of the approaches are 
also discussed.  
There are three main methods for solving the Chemical Source Isolation problem: 
i) Backward Approach, ii) Forward Approach and iii) Bayesian probabilistic modelling. 
We review these methods below. 
A. BACKWARD APPROACH 
In the Backward approach, one reverses time to come up with estimates of the 
location and release rates of a chemical attack through the use of sensor data and running 
an ATD model backwards in time. The advantage of this approach is that it eliminates the 
tedious process of building a large library of threat scenarios. The disadvantages are that 
the model relies on simplifying assumptions that are not necessarily met in reality. 
Furthermore, inverse models are computational intensive and the computational burden is 
compounded as the model is repeatedly run with each new detection event (Fry et al., 
2005). 
B. FORWARD APPROACH 
In the Forward approach, one guesses the location and strength of the source, then 
uses ATD models to estimate the location and release rates of a chemical attack. The 
estimates are then compared to actual sensor alarms and a series of mathematical and 
statistical methods are applied to iterate the initial guess. This continues until a match is 
achieved between the projected and actual sensor alarms. A shortcoming of this approach 
is that many runs of the ATD model are required. This shortcoming is overcome by 
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building a comprehensive pre-run library of ATD models. However scenarios not 
represented in the library will suffer inaccuracies due to extrapolation. 
Traditional algorithms for data interpretation generally attempt to fit an ATD 
model to measurements of airborne pollutants. The fit is usually achieved by iteratively 
adjusting model input parameters until they reasonably predict the data. For real-time 
sensor data interpretation, this approach is too slow because it needs to execute 
computationally intensive ATD models, it executes the models repeatedly as new or 
successive sensor data become available, and it requires a considerable amount of data 
before the algorithm finds a unique solution or estimates the uncertainty in the calibrated 
parameters. Finally, the computational burdens required by the forward approach can be 
so great that using it for pre-event planning, such as to determine optimal monitoring 
locations, sampling plans, and sensor performance criteria, can be excessively 
cumbersome (Sohn et al., 2002). 
Many of these problems can be solved using a technique called Kalman filtering. 
This technique is well-suited for many sensor interpretation applications and has been 
successfully applied, for example, to estimate the source strength of pollutant releases in 
multi-zone buildings. However, Kalman filtering is best used for linear systems with well 
conditioned input-to-output parameter covariance matrices and strong observability 
between the internal-state variables (e.g., the model input parameters of an ATD model) 
and the model outputs (e.g., concentration predictions). Many chemical kinetics and 
transport phenomena, such as second-order pollutant degradation, density-driven 
pollutant transport, aerosol coagulation, and second-order pollutant diffusion in sorption-
desorption, are not linear. Furthermore, wide uncertainty bounds exist for several of the 
model inputs, such as, there being many possible source locations, amounts released, 
durations of releases, and meteorological conditions. These will invariably lead to ill-
conditioned covariance matrices and poorly observable systems. Although many 
nonlinear models may be linearized using an extended Kalman filtering technique, the 
technique requires considerable tuning and adjustments because of the linear 
approximations (Sohn et al., 2002). 
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C. BAYESIAN PROBABLISTIC MODELS 
Researchers have also tried to develop probabilistic models of both the agent’s 
concentration in an atmospheric plume and the sensor’s capability of detecting that agent 
in a given concentration. The probabilities will yield the likelihood of a chemical attack 
at a certain location and the agent type and quantity released. The advantage of this 
approach is that it captures the uncertainty of both the dispersion characteristic of the 
chemical threat and the detection characteristic of the chemical sensor, thereby providing 
a more realistic representation of the situation and a better solution for the chemical 
source isolation problem. 
This approach is used by the UK‘s Defense Science and Technology Laboratory 
and is intended to form a component of the forthcoming Nuclear, Biological and 
Chemical Battlespace Information System Application (NBC BISA). The NBC BISA 
seeks to fuse data from an array of sensors to make inference about the possible source 
locations, times, agent types and masses of chemical release (Rapley et al., 2005).  
The probabilistic atmospheric dispersion model used by the NBC BISA uses a 
truncated normal distribution. It does not predict the actual small scale detail of the 
dispersion like Gaussian puff and other ATD models. Rather, it calculates the statistical 
properties of the dispersing cloud. The sensor model used by the NBC BISA is developed 
for a generic ion mobility detector and is normally distributed with a measurement error. 
Also a proportionality constant that accounts for the thermal motion of the electrons in 
the components is used in the sensor model (Rapley et al., 2005). 
D. APPROACH USED IN THIS THESIS 
Taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches 
available from the literature, this thesis uses a Bayesian updating model to develop a 
multi-dimensional probability map to identify the location and time of a chemical attack. 
As in the NBC BISA model, we apply Bayes’s Theorem to calculate posterior 
probabilities; however the prior probabilities are calculated differently. The development 
of the model and the parameters involved are discussed in Chapter III. 
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III. THE MODEL  
We use a Bayesian updating model for detecting a chemical attack, determining 
its location l and estimating the time of attack t. The model uses data obtained from 
sensors deployed in the area of operations monitoring the air for a possible chemical 
attack. 
A. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
There are two time scales used in the model. The attack time scale, denoted by the 
index t, represents the time horizon during which a chemical attack can be detected. We 
assume that this time horizon is of length T. The detection time scale, denoted by the 
index u, represents the current time in which updates are received from the sensors and 
probability maps are generated. The attack time scale runs backwards relative to the 







Figure 1.   Attack and detection time scales 
 
As time progresses along the u scale, the t scale slides along with it such that the 
model always calculates the probability of an occurrence of a chemical attack up to T 
time periods before the current time u. 
The model is developed based on the occurrence of two events. The first event, 
denoted Al,t, is a chemical attack, characterized by its location l and time of occurrence t 
t=1 t=0 
u=2 u=1 
Detection time  
scale 
Attack  time scale 
relative to u =1 
Attack  time scale 




time periods ago. The second event, denoted Ds, is a detection of a chemical attack by 
sensor s, out of a set of sensors S that are deployed to monitor chemical attacks.  
In the model, we use the following notation. 
 
Al,t       –   An event that a chemical attack has occurred at location l, t time periods ago. 
u
sD       –   An event that sensor s signals a detection at time u. 
u
sD       –   Complement of 
u
sD .      
u
l     = Initial (a-priori) probability of a chemical attack at location l at time period u. 
(Absent specific intelligence we assume that ul   0 ,l u . Also note that these 




l t     = Prior probability of a chemical attack at location l, t time periods ago before an 
observation at time period u. 
,
u
l t    = Posterior probability of a chemical attack at location l, t time periods ago after 




l tP     = Probability that a sensor located at location s detects at time period u a chemical 
attack at location l that occurred t time period ago. We assume stationary 
detection capability, that is, ,,
s u
l tP = ,
s
l tP     u . 
1 q   = Single-period false positive probability: the probability that a sensor signals 
detection given there is no attack during a time period. 
T       = Time horizon for detecting an attack. (We assume that there is at most one attack 
during any time horizon T.) 
L         = Number of locations in the area of operations. 
 
The parameters 
0 , ,,s ul tP , L, T and 1 q are inputs to the model. 
1. Single Sensor Model 
We start with a model only involving a single sensor monitoring a set of L 
locations. Thus, we suppress the index s. 
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The input parameter 0  , which is the a-priori  probability of a chemical attack at 
a certain location and time period, is determined by threat and vulnerability studies which 
are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Consider the first detection time period u =1. The prior probabilities of an attack 
are the a-priori probabilities. That is, 
1 0
,l t           ,l  t  
To calculate the posterior probabilities 1,l t  , we use Bayes‘s Theorem. If the 
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At each time step u the values of ,
u
l t  generate a probability map that gives the 
most updated probabilities of an attack at location l, t time periods ago. At each time step, 
following the cue from the sensor (detection or non-detection) the probability map is 
updated. An alarm goes off if at a certain point u, an  ,
u
l t  value crosses a threshold, 
which triggers an action responding to the detected chemical threat. 
2. Multiple Sensors Model 
Now we extend the single sensor model to include updates from multiple 
independent sensors used to monitor a set of L locations. As for the single sensor, we use 
Bayes theorem to calculate 1,l t  .  
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If the sensor readings are mixed, so that sensors 1 to n record a detection, and 




11 1 1 , ,1 1 1












(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
n sn l t l t




l t l t l t
s s n
n S
s s s n n
l t l tl t l t
l t l ts s n
P D D D D A P A
P A D D D D
P D D D D
P P



















In general,  ,ul t   , the prior probability at time step u for an attack at location l, t 
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If at time u, sensors 1…n produce detection cues while sensor n+1…S did not, 
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Equations 3 and 4 are computed for each time step u, based on the sensor cues in 
that time step and the prior probabilities. The resulting values constitute an L  T 
probability map at time period u, where the  , ul t  entry , the probability at time step u of 
a chemical attack at location l, t time periods ago is ,
u
l t . 
B.  ESTIMATING THE VALUES OF ,
s
l tP  
The probability that a sensor located at location s detects a chemical attack at 
location l that occurred t time periods ago, represented by ,
s
l tP , is an important parameter 
in the model. The estimation of the ,
s
l tP  values entails the use of a physical model and a 
sensor model.  
Section 1 describes the physical model that is used to calculate the chemical 
concentration at the sensor location from a chemical attack at location l that occurred t 
time periods ago.  Section 2 describes the sensor model that derives the probability of 
detection given the chemical concentration calculated by the physical model in section 1. 
1. Physical Model 
The probability density function (PDF) of the chemical concentration in an 
atmospheric plume is very hard to determine. Measurements of the frequency distribution 
of fluctuating plume concentrations have revealed that the PDF is generally strongly 
skewed to the right with an upper tail that is heavier than that of the Gaussian form. A 
large number of mathematical forms have been used to model the concentration PDF 
such as the lognormal distribution, the exponential distribution, the truncated normal 
distribution, the beta-Jacobi distribution, and a linear combination of exponential and 
generalized Pareto PDFs. However, despite this enormous effort, there is still no general 
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agreement on the parametric PDF model that provides the best fit to plume concentration 
data over a wide range of experimental conditions (Chan et al., 1997). 
Hence, due to the difficulties mentioned above, a deterministic physical model is 
used instead to calculate the expected temporal and spatial concentration of a chemical 
plume resulting from a chemical attack.  
The physical model consists of two main components: (i) the source emission 
model and (ii) the dispersion model. The source emission model serves to calculate the 
initial concentration at the chemical attack location, while the dispersion model calculates 
the spread of the chemical agent, taking into account weather and terrain characteristics. 
The inputs and outputs of the various components of the two models and their 













Figure 2.   Components of the physical model 
 
For this study the Atmospheric Threat Dispersion Model are the Gaussian Puff 
model for attacks that encompass an instantaneous release, and the steady state Gaussian 
Plume model for continuous releases. Although both Gaussian Models are reviewed, only 
the Gaussian Puff model is used in the study. The source emission models depend on the 
Spread and concentration of 




Release Type:  
instantaneous, continuous, 
etc 
Release rate or release amount 
 




Time of release 
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chemical agent being modeled and are typically classified. In this study, we bypass the 
source emission models and feed a release amount directly to the ATD model. 
a. Gaussian Puff Model 
The Gaussian Puff model describes the temporal and spatial concentration 
of material from a single release of a fixed amount of material. Figure 3 shows the 




Figure 3.   Gaussian Puff development over time [From: Crowl et al., 2002] 
 
The assumption is that the chemical attack is expected to be executed at 
ground level (z=0) and the sensors are also placed on the ground, hence the Gaussian Puff 
model equations can be simplified as follows (Crowl et al., 2002). 
2* 2
23/2
1( , ,0, ) exp (5)
22
m
x yx y z
Q x wt yC x y t     
              
 
 
where : C is the concentration in mg/m3 
x is the distance away from the source in the x-coordinate in  meters; 
y is the distance away from the source in the y-coordinate in  meters; 
*
mQ  is the amount of chemical released in mg/m
3;  
w is the wind speed in the direction of the x-coordinate in meters/second 
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t is the time, in seconds, since the chemical release; and 
, ,x y z   ,  are the Pasquill Gifford (PG) dispersion coefficients for puff            
dispersion. 
Equation 5 can also be used to calculate the temporal concentration of 
material from a single release of a fixed amount of material even when the prevailing 
wind direction is not in the direction of the x-coordinate of the area cells. This is achieved 
via a transformation of the coordinate systems. 
The PG dispersion coefficients are functions of the atmospheric conditions 
and the distance downwind from the release point. The atmospheric conditions are 
classified according to six different stability classes shown in Table 1. The stability class 
depends on wind speed and quantity of sunlight. During the day, increased wind speed 
results in greater atmospheric stability whereas at night the reverse is true. This difference 
is due to a change in vertical temperature profiles from day to night (Crowl et al., 2002). 
 
Table 1.   PG stability classes [From: Crowl et al., 2002] 
Day-time Insolation Night-time conditions Surface wind 
speed (m/s) Strong Moderate Slight Thin overcast  Cloudy 
<2 A A-B B F F 
2-3 A-B B C E F 
3-4 B B-C C D E 
4-6 C C-D D D D 
>6 C D D D D 
 
The equations for PG dispersion Coefficients for Puff Dispersion with x as 
the distance away from the source in the x-coordinate in meters are as shown in Table 2 




Table 2.   Recommended functions for PG dispersion Coefficients [From: Crowl et 
al., 2002] 
PG stability class ,x y  (meters) z (meters) 
A 0.18x0.92 0.60x0.75 
B 0.14x0.92 0.53x0.73 
C 0.10x0.92 0.34x0.71 
D 0.06x0.92 0.15x0.70 
E 0.04x0.92 0.10x0.65 
F 0.02x0.89 0.05x0.61 
 
Equation 5, together with Tables 1 and 2 facilitate the calculation of the 
concentration of the chemical at every location in the area of operations.  
b. Gaussian Plume Model 
A Gaussian Plume model represents the plume diffusion in a continuous 
release for a range of atmospheric conditions. The technique applies the standard 
deviations of the Gaussian distribution in two directions to represent the characteristics of 
the plume downwind of its origin. The plume’s shape, and hence the standard deviations, 
varies according to the specific meteorological conditions (Liu, 1997). 
A number of assumptions are typically used for Gaussian modeling of a 
plume. First, the analysis assumes a steady state system (i.e., a source continuously emits 
at a constant strength, the wind speed, direction, and diffusion characteristics of the 
plume remain steady, and no chemical transformations take place in the plume). Second, 
diffusion in the x direction is ignored, although transport in this direction is accounted for 
by wind speed. Third, the plume is reflected up at the ground rather than being deposited, 
according to the rules of conservation of matter (i.e., none of the pollutant is removed 
from the plume as it moves downwind). Fourth, the model applies to an ideal aerosol or 
an inert gas. Particles greater than 20 mm in diameter tend to settle out of the atmosphere 
at an appreciable rate (Liu, 1997). 
For the concentrations at ground level, z can be set equal to zero and if the 
emission source is located at ground level with no effective plume rise, the steady state 
Gaussian plume equation is as follows (Liu, 1997) : 
 19
2
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w  
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where : C is the concentration in mg/m3; 
x is the distance away from the source in the x-coordinate in  meters; 
y is the distance away from the source in the y-coordinate in  meters; 
mQ  is the amount of chemical released in mg/m
3s;  
w is the wind speed in the direction of the x-coordinate in meters/second; 
 ,y z  , are PG dispersion coefficients for plume dispersion. 
The recommended PG dispersion coefficients for plume dispersion are 
shown in Table 3, where x is the distance away from the source in the x-coordinate in 
meters Crowl et al., 2002). 
 
Table 3.   Recommended PG plume dispersion coefficients [From: Crowl et al., 
2002] 
PG stability class y (meters) z (meters) 
A 0.22x(1+ 0.0001x)-1/2 0.20x 
B 0.16x(1+ 0.0001x)-1/2 0.12x 
C 0.11x(1+ 0.0001x)-1/2 0.08x(1+ 0.0002x)-1/2 
D 0.08x(1+ 0.0001x)-1/2 0.06x(1+ 0.0015x)-1/2 
E 0.06x(1+ 0.0001x)-1/2 0.03x(1+ 0.0003x)-1 
F 0.04x(1+ 0.0001x)-1/2 0.016x(1+ 0.0003x)-1 
 
Equation 6, together with the stability class for the attack scenario and its 
corresponding PG dispersion coefficients for varying distances from the chemical source, 
lets us calculate the concentration of the chemical at every location in the area of 
operations.  
2. Sensor Model 
The Gaussian puff and plume models described in section 1 provide techniques 
for calculating the chemical concentration at a certain point relative to the release point. 
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To calculate the values of ,
s
l tP , we need to develop a model that captures the detection 
performance characteristics of a sensor. Specifically, the sensor model calculates the 
probability that a sensor will detect a chemical release at a given concentration.  
In order to develop a probabilistic model of the sensor’s capability to detect a 
chemical threat, the modeler must have a good grasp of the detection technology used, as 
well as have access to detection data obtained from laboratory trials. For example, ion 
mobility-based sensors have an upper alarm threshold, beyond which they cannot indicate 
the presence of a higher concentration due to a limiting ionizing capability of the sensor. 
Sensor model parameters are usually classified information as they reveal the sensor’s 
detection effectiveness and hence strength and vulnerabilities of the defender. 
Next, we develop two different sensor models: a cookie cutter model and a 
continuous model. For a given agent, a sensor model determines the probability ( )sP c of 
sensor s detecting the agent at concentration c. If, following a release at location l, t time 
periods ago, the concentration of the agent at the location of sensor s is ,
s
l tc , then 
, ,( )
s s s
l t l tP P c . The values of ,sl tc  are obtained from the physical model. 
a. Cookie Cutter Model 








The detection threshold dt is obtained from the technical specifications of 
the sensor being modeled. As before, 1 q  is the false positive probability. In this thesis 
the sensor modeled is the AP4C chemical warfare agent detector manufactured by 
Proengin (Proengin, 2009). The values of dt for the AP4C sensor, with respect to three 





Table 4.   Detection thresholds for the AP4C sensor [From: Proengin, 2009] 
Agent Type  
Nerve Blister Blood 
Detection Threshold (mg/m3) 0.01 1.5 10 
 
Chemical agents are typically classified into nerve, blister or blood agents, 
in accordance to the way that they affect the human body. Nerve agents are a class of 
organophosphates that disrupt the mechanism by which nerves transfer messages to 
organs. Poisoning by a nerve agent leads to convulsions and eventual death by 
asphyxiation as control is lost over respiratory muscles. Blister agents consist of either 
nitrogen-based, or sulphur-based mustards, and Lewisites (organoarsenic compounds). 
They cause severe chemical burns, resulting in large, painful water blisters on the bodies 
of those affected. Blood agents are a class of chemicals containing cyanide or arsenic. 
They cause death through respiratory failure by blocking the blood’s ability to deliver 
oxygen to body tissues. 
The cookie cutter sensor model is a simplistic model which gives a rough 
representation of the sensor’s capabilities. However this model can be used as a 
reasonable approximation if detailed information of the detection performance of the 
sensor is not available. Most of the time, the only available information of the sensor’s 
detection capability is its detection threshold which is used in the cookie cutter model. 
Further in-house laboratory trials are required to assess the sensor’s detection capabilities 
across various concentration and environmental ranges.  
b. Continuous Model 
In a continuous sensor model ( )sP c is a continuous function of c.  For the 
AP4C chemical sensor the continuous function is approximated by six ranges, or alarm 
thresholds, called bars. A bar is an indicator alarm on the AP4C detector that indicates 
the concentration of the agent detected.  Table 5 presents these alarm thresholds for the 
three types of agents—Nerve, Blister and Blood. 
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Table 5.   Alarm thresholds in mg/m3 of the AP4C sensor [From: Proengin, 2009] 
Agent Type Alarm Thresholds 
Nerve Blister Blood 
1 bar 0.01 1.5 10 
2 bar 0.125 2 30 
3 bar 0.5 4 50 
4 bar 2 10 100 
5 bar 7.5 25 200 
5 bar flashing 30 50 500 
 
The detection technology of the AP4C sensor is flame spectrophotometry. 
The chemical agent is detected by analyzing the light spectrum created by burning the 
gas. Quantification is achieved by measuring the amplitude of the relevant peaks. The 
sensor’s response is linear below the saturation point where the detector burning capacity 
is reached, as reflected by the 5 bar flashing threshold. 
Hence, for the AP4C sensor,  ( )sP c  is equal to 1 if the chemical 
concentration c is equal to or exceeds the alarm threshold of 5 bars blinking.  ( )sP c  
decreases by 0.1 across the lower alarm thresholds until the detection threshold of one bar 
is reached, after which ( )sP c equals 1 q , the false positive probability. This relationship 








if c alarm threshold of bar blinking
if c alarm threshold of bars and bars blinking
if c alarm threshold of bars and bars
P c if c alarm threshold of bars and bars









c alarm threshold of bar and bars
q otherwise
   
 
The continuous sensor model gives a better resolution to the probability of 
detection then the cookie cutter sensor. However a comprehensive understanding of the 
sensor’s principles of operation as well as detailed laboratory trial results are needed to 
obtain this more refined formulation. 
 23
3. Summary of the Detection Model 
The detection model is made up of 3 modules: i) a physical model; ii) a sensor 
model; and iii) a Bayesian updating model . The physical model serves to calculate the 
chemical concentration c at the location of sensor s due to an attack at location l, t time 
periods ago. Based on the output c of the physical model, the sensor model computes the 
probabilities, ( )sP C . The combination of the physical and sensor models produce the ,
s
l tP  
values. The Bayesian updating model calculates the probability map at time period u, 
,
u
l t . High value of ,ul t  indicates that there is a strong likelihood that a chemical attack 
has occurred at location l, t time periods ago. 


























 Gaussian Puff for instantaneous releases 
 Gaussian Plume for continuous releases 
Sensor model: 
 Cookie cutter sensor model 
 Continuous sensor model 
Bayesian updating model: 
 Single sensor model  
 Multiple sensors model 
THE MODEL 
c, chemical concentration due to an attack at location 
l, t time periods ago arriving at the location of sensor s 
,
s
l tP , the probability that a sensor located at location s 
detects a chemical attack at location l, that occurred t 
time period ago 
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IV. SMALL SCALE TEST CASES: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
In this chapter, we perform small scale simulation tests using MATLAB for 
evaluating the effectiveness of the model developed in Chapter III.  We compare the 
single sensor and multiple-sensors models and illustrate the advantage of having a larger 
number of sensors in achieving better estimates of the attack location and time. The small 
scale test cases also serve as preliminary checks on the model integrity and 
implementation. 
The Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) used are: 
 Accurately identifying the source location; and 
 Accurately identifying the time of release. 
These MOEs are chosen due to their impact on operations. The source location 
and time of release are critical inputs for threat management and control and therefore 
their accuracy is paramount for making important tactical decisions. 
The small scale scenario comprises an area of 300m x 300m divided into nine 
cells of 100m x 100m each. The time period is one minute and the chemical attack occurs 
at cell 4 at u = 4. 
A.  SINGLE-SENSOR 
The single sensor is placed in cell 5 (see Figure 5). The sensor is operational at    
u = 0 (0800h).  During the simulation run, which ends 10 time periods later at 0810h, the 
















7 8 9 
 
Figure 5.   Test setup of the small scale case study for a single sensor 
 
The input parameters for this model are summarized in Table 6. 
The attack location is area cell 4, the nerve agent used in the attack is Sarin and 
the amount of agent released is 50kg. The time of attack is simulated to occur at u = 4. 
We assume 0l ,probability of a chemical attack at location l in a given time period to be 
0.001. 
 
Table 6.   Model input parameters for the small-scale test case scenarios 
(I) Physical model(Gaussian Puff) 
Type of Chemical Warfare 
Agent  
Nerve Agent 
Quantity released (kg/m3) 50 
Wind direction (°) 90 




(II) Sensor model  
c, the chemical concentration arriving at sensor s is obtained from the physical model 







if c mg m
P c
q otherwise
   
 
Wind direction 













0.9 7.5 / 30 /
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q otherwise
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(III) Bayesian updating model 
0
l , probability of a chemical attack at location l in a given time period 0.001 
1 q , false positive probability 0.2 
,
s
l tP , Probability that a sensor located at location s detects at time u a 







1. Results from the Physical Model 
The results from the Gaussian puff model are listed in Table 7, where X represents 
the distance away from the source in the x-axis in meters, and Y represents the distance 
away from the source in the y-axis in meters. 
 
Table 7.   Chemical concentration according to the Gaussian Puff model for the 
small-scale test scenario 
  Concentration in mg/m3  
X(meters) Y(meters) 0 min 1 min 2 min 3 min 4 min 5 min 6 min
0 0 1053503 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 200 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
100 0 0.00 213.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
100 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
100 200 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
200 0 0.00 0.40 30.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
200 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
200 200 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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2. Results from the Sensor Model 
Using c, the chemical concentration arriving at sensor s obtained from the output 
of the Gaussian puff model, both the cookie cutter and continuous sensor model yield the 
following values of 5,l tP ,  where 
5
,l tP  is the probability that the sensor placed at location 5 
currently detects a chemical attack at location l, that occurred t time period ago. The 
values of 5,l tP  are shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8.   5,l tP  values  for the small-scale test scenario 
  Attack time scale, t time periods since the occurrence of the chemical attack
Location(l) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
4 0.2 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
5 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 
3. Results from the Bayesian Updating Model 
At u = 0, we have no updates from the sensor located at cell 5, hence, 0l  , the 
probability of a chemical attack at location l in a given time period, is determined by 
threat and vulnerability studies of the defender. For this test case, we assume that it is 
uniformly distributed over the area cells with a value of 0.001. The probability map for 
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Attack time horizon tAttack location  
Figure 6.   Probability map at u = 0 for the small scale case study for a single sensor 
 
At u = 1, the sensor records no detection, hence 1,l t   decreases for the cells at 
which a chemical attack at t = 0 to 9 time periods ago are expected to give off a sensor 

































Figure 7.   Probability map at u  = 1 for the small scale case study for a single sensor 
 
The sensor continues with no detections up to u =4. Hence 4,l t   decreases for the 
cells at which a chemical attack at t = 0 to 9 time periods are expected to give off a 






































Figure 8.   Probability map at  u = 4  for the small scale case study for a single sensor 
 
At u = 5, the sensor updates with a detection alarm, hence 5,l t   increases for the 
cells at which a chemical attack at  t = 0 to 9 time periods ago are expected to give off a 
sensor alarm. From Figure 9, we can see peaks for releases at (i) location 5 at    t = 0, (ii) 
































Figure 9.   Probability map at u = 5  for the small scale case study for a single sensor 
 
From the Gaussian puff model, the chemical plume generated from the chemical 
attack at location 4 at u = 4 passes over the sensor placed at location 5 at u = 5. Hence no 
more correct detection updates can be received from the sensor from time u = 6 onwards. 
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The peaks observed are preserved and continue to slide across the attack time horizon, as 
































Figure 10.   Probability map at u = 6   for the small scale case study for a single sensor 
 
The peaks observed are preserved and continues to slide across the attack time 
horizon with each update till the end of the simulation at u = 10. From the contour plot in 
Figure 11, it can be seen that the model produces two estimates of the location and time 
of the chemical attack. They are (i) cell location 5 at u = 5 (t = 5) with a posterior 
probability of 0.00501 and (ii) cell location 4 at u = 4 which is the true attack, with a 
posterior probability of 0.00502.  



















Attack time horizon 5, (0805h)
Probability = 0.00501
Cell location 4,
Attack time horizon 6, (0804h)
Probability = 0.00502
 
Figure 11.   Probability map at u = 10  for the small scale case study for a single sensor 
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Notice that both estimates – the erroneous one in i and the correct one in ii – are 
identified with negligible probabilities. These inconclusive results are due to the 
relatively high false positive probability (0.2) and the poor coverage by only one sensor.  
Next we extend the single sensor model to a multiple-sensors model, which is a 
more accurate abstraction of reality.  
B.  MULTIPLE SENSORS SMALL SCALE TEST SCENARIO 
Suppose that in addition to the sensor in cell 5, sensors are also placed in cells 4 
and 6. During the simulation run, which ends 10 time periods later, the sensor placed at 
cell 4 returns a single alarm at u = 4, the sensor placed at cell 5 returns a single alarm at  










Figure 12.   Test setup of the small scale case study with multiple sensors 
 
1. Results from the Physical Model 
The results from the Gaussian puff model for the multiple sensors small scale 
scenario are exactly the same as that of the single sensor case test since they share the 
same chemical attack scenario. 
 
1 2 3 
4 5 6 
7 8 9 
Wind direction 





2. Results from the Sensor Model 
Using c, the chemical concentration arriving at sensor s obtained from the output 
of the Gaussian puff model, both the cookie cutter and continuous sensor model yield the 
following values of ,
s
l tP , where s = 4, 5 and 6. This is because the dispersion of the 
chemical plume over the area of the small scale test scenario does not exhibit large 
deviations in concentrations. 
Table 9.   Results from the sensor model for sensor 4 
 4,l tP  Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
4 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 
 
Table 10.   Results from the sensor model for sensor 5 (the same as for the single 
sensor case) 
 5,l tP  Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
4 0.2 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
5 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
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Table 11.   Results from the sensor model for sensor 6 
  6,l tP  Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
4 0.2 0.2 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
5 0.2 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
6 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 
3. Results from the Bayesian Updating Model 
At u = 0 (0800h), all three sensors do not report, hence 0  , the probability of a 
chemical attack at any location in a given time period is determined by threat and 
vulnerability studies. As before, we assume that 0  = 0.001. The probability map at        































Attack time horizon tAttack location  




At u = 1, all 3 sensors still do not report, hence 1,l t  decreases for the cells at 
which a chemical attack at t = 0 to 9 time periods ago relative to u = 1, is expected to give 
off a sensor alarm. The cells affected are 4, 5 and 6. The probability map at u = 1 is as 

































Figure 14.   Probability map at u = 1  for the small scale case study with multiple sensors 
 
 
The 3 sensors continue not to respond up to u = 3 (0803h). Hence the values of 
3
,l t  decrease for the cells at which a chemical attack at t = 0 to 9 time periods ago 
relative to u = 3, is expected to give off a sensor alarm. The cells affected are 4, 5 and 6. 

































Figure 15.   Probability map at u  = 3 for the small scale case study with multiple sensors 
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At u = 4,  the sensor placed at cell 4 reports a detection, hence the value of 4,l t  
increases for the cells at which a chemical attack at t = 0 to 9 time periods ago relative to 
u, is expected to give off a sensor alarm. The sensors in cells 5 and 6 do not signal 

































Figure 16.   Probability map at u = 4 for the small scale case study with multiple sensors 
 
At u = 5, the sensor placed at cell 5 reports a detection while the sensors in 4 and 
6 do not report a detection. The value of 5,l t   increases for the cells at which a chemical 
attack at t = 0 to 9 time periods ago relative to u, is expected to give off a sensor alarm. 
From Figure 17, we can see a new peak for a release at location 5 at t = 0 and an increase 






























Figure 17.   Probability map at u = 5 for the small scale case study with multiple sensors 
 
At u = 6, the sensor placed at cell 6 reports a detection while the sensors at cells 4 
and 5 do not report a detection. The value of 6,l t  increases for the cells at which a 
chemical attack at t = 0 to 9 time periods ago relative to u, is expected to give off a sensor 
alarm. From Figure 18, we can see a new peak for a release at location 6 at t = 0 and an 




























Figure 18.   Probability map at u = 6  for the small scale case study with multiple sensors 
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From the Gaussian puff model, the chemical plume generated from the chemical 
attack at location 4 at u = 4 passes over all the sensors placed in the area of operation at   
u = 7.  Hence no more detection reports can be received from the sensors. The peaks 
observed are preserved and continue to slide across the attack time horizon as shown in 




























Figure 19.   Probability map at u = 7  for the small scale case study with multiple sensors 
 
From the contour plot at u = 10, in Figure 20, it can be seen that the model 
































Figure 20.   Probability map at u = 10 for the small scale case study with multiple sensors 
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From the series of probability maps above, the peaks observed from the onset of 
the first alarm continue to slide across the attack horizon with each update until the end of 
the simulation. The chemical attack characteristic can be identified to be at location 4 at u 
= 4 with a probability of occurrence of 0.11. 
The actual time of release and attack location in this simulation is l = 4 and u =  4, 
which is the estimate given by the model. The posterior probability obtained for an attack 
at u = 4 at l = 4 is 0.11 is too low to sound an alarm that triggers a response. This 
probability value, while larger than the value obtained for the single sensor case, is still 
low because of relatively high false positive probability and insufficient coverage. 
C.  COMPARISON STUDY BETWEEN SINGLE-SENSOR AND   
MULTIPLE-SENSORS MODEL 
With all scenario parameters kept constant with the exception of the number of 
sensors used, it is evident that with multiple sensors, the model is better able to estimate 
both the location and time of attack. Table12 summarizes the results obtained from both 
models for the same threat scenario. 
 
Table 12.   Results of comparison study between single and multiple sensors model 
 Attack 
Location (l) 
Time of attack 
(t) 
Probability of attack at location 
l and time t 
Actual  4 0804 - 







Multiple Sensor 4 0804 0.11 
 
For the same attack scenario, the multiple-sensors model provides more accurate 
estimates of the location and time of the attack (probability of 0.11). The single sensor 
model, on the other hand, returns multiple estimates with low probabilities. Hence it is 
concluded that a multiple sensors model provides better estimates of a chemical attack. 
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The simple test cases serve as a preliminary check on the model integrity and 
implementation. The multiple-sensors model was found to able to estimate accurately 
both the time and location of the attack. With this encouragement, the multiple-sensors 





V. MODEL EVALUATION 
In this chapter, we evaluate the model with respect to settings that more closely 
depict real-world scenarios. Preliminary simulation runs are first performed to (i) 
establish the noise floor of the model and (ii) select an alarm threshold for the probability 
map provided that will trigger a response to the chemical attack detected.  The noise floor 
of the model is the baseline value of the posterior probabilities in the probability maps 
that is attributed to the presence of false positive signals. Based on the preliminary 
simulation runs, an experimental test matrix is developed to evaluate the model and 
determine the contribution of the lead factors. 
In evaluating the model, a false positive error is defined as a signal from a sensor 
that is exposed to a chemical concentration below its detection threshold. A false negative 
error is defined as the absence of a signal from a sensor that is exposed to a chemical 
concentration which is above the detection threshold of the sensor. 
Section A describes the basic scenario that is used for the evaluation. Section B 
discusses the results of the preliminary simulation runs. Section C details the test matrix 
used for evaluating the model. Section D discusses the evaluation results of the model. 
Section E discusses the insights obtained on sensor coverage and deployment. 
A.  BASIC SCENARIO 
The area of operations is a 1km 1km square divided into a grid of 100 location 
cells (henceforth called cells) each of size 100m100m. A total of 16 sensors are 
deployed in the area of operations. The placement of the sensors is fixed throughout and 
follows common operational tactics. The prevailing wind speed and direction are 1.67m/s 
and east, respectively.  
It is assumed that on average there are 10 false positive signals during a one-hour 
period. Hence1 q , the probability of a false positive cue from any of the 16 sensors 
deployed in a one-minute time period is set to be 10/(60 x 16) =0.0104.  The quantity of 
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chemical agent which is assumed to be Sarin to be released, is set to a nominal attack 
quantity of 50kg and we assume that the attack occurs at u = 5. 


















Figure 21.   Illustration of the area of operations 
B.  PRELIMINARY TRIALS 
Four attack locations are randomly selected amongst the 100 locations possible. In 
addition, a simulation test case with no attack is also performed.  Each of the five 
preliminary simulation test cases is replicated five times. The simulation tests cases are 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 
1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 
2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 2 8 2 9 3 0 
3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 5 3 6 3 7 3 8 3 9 4 0 
4 1 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 5 4 6 4 7 4 8 4 9 5 0 
5 1 5 2 5 3 5 4 5 5 5 6 5 7 5 8 5 9 6 0 
6 1 6 2 6 3 6 4 6 5 6 6 6 7 6 8 6 9 7 0 
7 1 7 2 7 3 7 4 7 5 7 6 7 7 7 8 7 9 8 0 
8 1 8 2 8 3 8 4 8 5 8 6 8 7 8 8 8 9 9 0 





Table 13.   Test cases and their attack location for the preliminary trials 
Test Case Number Attack location 






The simulation details of the test cases are summarized in Table 14. 
 
Table 14.   Simulation details of the preliminary trials 
Simulation Details   
Fixed parameters   
Area of operations 1km   1km 
Grid representation 10 by 10 cells 
Cell resolution 100m 
Meteorological Data   
wind speed 1.67 
wind direction East 
stability class A 
Sensor Data   
Number of sensors deployed 16 
Locations of sensors Cell 1, 10,14,17,33,38,41,45,50,56,63,68,84,87,91,100 
Chemical attack data   
Chemical agent used Sarin 
Release type Instantaneous 
Quantity released 50kg 
Time of attack u = 5 
Parameters varied   
Sensor signal return Simulated to return 1 with a probability of detection ,
s
l tP , 
0 with probability ,1
s
l tP , where ,sl tP  is determined by the 
physical  and sensor models. 
 
The inputs parameters of the model are summarized in Table 15. 
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Table 15.   Input parameters of the model 
(I) Physical model(Gaussian Puff) 
Chemical Warfare Agent  Sarin 
Quantity released (kg/m3) 50 
Wind direction (°) 90 
Wind speed (m/s) 1.666666667 
Pasquill-Gifford stability class A 
(II) Sensor model  









0.9 7.5 / 30 /
0.8 2 / 7.5 /
( ) 0.7 0.5 / 2 /
0.6 0.125 / 0.5 /




if c mg m
if c mg m and mg m
if c mg m and mg m
P c if c mg m and mg m
if c mg m and mg m
if c mg m
q otherwise
            
 
(III) Bayesian updating model 
L, number of attack locations 100 
T,  time horizon of an attack in the area of operation 15 
0 , a priori probability of a chemical attack at a certain location in a 
given time period 
0.001 
1-q , false positive probability 0.0104 
,
s
l tP , probability that a sensor located at location s detects at time u a 





1. Results from the Physical Model 
The results from the Gaussian puff model give the temporal concentration of 
material from the release of 50kg of the nerve agent Sarin at u = 0. Figure 22 depicts the 
dispersion of the nerve agent along the x and y directions from the chemical release 
source, at 1 minute intervals. The x-axis and y-axis show the distance in meters from the 
chemical source in the x and y direction, respectively. The right hand side scale shows the 
concentration of the chemical plume in mg/m3. 
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Figure 22.   Series of time plots that show concentration profiles of the chemical puff over 
distances from the source in the  x and y direction 
 
From the series of time plots in Figure 22, it can be seen that in 13 minutes, the 
chemical puff has passed over 1km, only leaving traces of low concentrations, 1x10-6 
mg/m3 , at a distance of 1km from the source location. Hence in our area of operations of 
size 1km by 1km, the chemical puff generated from any release location would pass over 
in at most 13 minutes, leaving trace concentrations that are below the detection threshold 
of the sensors. Thus, the time horizon T is bounded by 13 minutes. 



























u =13 u =12
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2. Results of the Sensor Model 
The results of the sensor model for the inputs given in Table 15 are shown in the 
Appendix. 
3. Simulation Results for Test Case 1, No Chemical Attack 
A no-attack test case aims to establish the noise floor of the system of sensors. 
This enables decision makers to set a lower bound on the alarm threshold for an action to 
be taken. Table 16 summarizes the number of false positive signals return for each 
simulation run. 
 
Table 16.   Number of false positive signals in each of the simulation runs 








Figure 23 shows the plot of , ,( ) max
u
l t l tg u  , the highest values per time period 
in the probability map  during the detection time horizon, for each of the five simulation 
runs. 
 
Figure 23.   Highest probability values,  , ,( ) max
u
l t l tg u  , within the probability map 
across the detection time horizon. 
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From Figure 23, it can be seen that, as expected, the noise floor increases with the 
number of false positive errors. Based on the 5 simulation runs performed we set the 
lower bound on the alarm threshold at 0.2.  In setting an alarm threshold for an action to 
be taken; a posterior probability of 0.7 is selected, which is reasonable for an estimated 
noise floor of 0.2. 
4. Simulation Results for Test Case 2, Attack at Location 45 
For an attack at cell 45, the Expected Number of Correct Signals (ENCS) is 5.27 
from 3 different sensors. The parameter ENCS is associated with a given cell l, and  is 
defined as the expected number of signals from the deployed sensors given a chemical 
attack at location l. The ENCS is a measure of the sensor coverage; the higher the value 
of ENCS for a certain cell, the better the sensor coverage of that cell. The ENCS  is 
dependent on the specific layout of the deployed sensors relative to the attack location. It 
is important to take notice of the ENCS as it is a factor that affects the performance of the 
model. The statistics of the five simulation runs are summarized in Table 17. 
 
Table 17.   Simulated sensor signals and model outputs for preliminary test case 2 
 Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4 Run 5 
Simulated signal returns 
Number signals from sensor 
deployed 7 7 7 6 13 
False positive errors 0 1 1 0 8 
False negative errors 0 1 1 1 1 
Correct signals 7 6 6 6 5 
Model outputs 
Estimate of attack location Cell 45 Cell 45 Cell 45 Cell 45 Cell 45 
Estimate of time of attack u = 5 u = 5 u = 5 u = 5 u = 5 
Location error (meters) 0 0 0 0 0 
Time of release error (mins) 0 0 0 0 0 
Time at which alarm threshold of 
0.7 is  crossed u  = 8 u = 8 u = 8 u = 9 u = 8 
Highest posterior for the correct 
location and time, 45, 5
u
u uMax    0.997 0.997 0.986 0.994 1 
Time at which the highest value 




u uArgMax    
Presence of incorrect posteriors  
> alarm threshold of 0.7 No No No No No 
Presence of incorrect posteriors  
> noise floor  of 0.2 No No No No Yes 
Is 45, 5 ,
u u
u l t      l, t, u?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
From Table 17, it can be seen that despite the presence of false positive and false 
negative errors the model accurately estimates the location and time of the attack within 4 
minutes of the occurrence of the attack. It is observed from run #4 that false negative 
errors can lead to a delay in crossing the alarm threshold (u = 9 as opposed to u = 8).  It is 
observed from run #5 that false positive and false negative errors can result in the 
presence of false estimates, where a false estimate is a posterior of an attack that is above 
the noise floor in a wrong location and/or at a time.  
We present here only the results of run #1. This run represents an ideal scenario in 
which there is no occurrence of any false positive or false negative errors. The respective 
times of the signals (indicated by 1) and the corresponding sensors that produced them 
are shown in Table 18 
 
Table 18.   Signals from the respective sensors for run #1 of test case 1 
  Location of sensor 
Detection 
time 
horizon(u) 1 10 14 17 33 38 41 45 50 56 63 68 84 87 91 100
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 
The series of probability maps for simulation run #1 is shown in Figure 24.  
Figure 24 compares the values of , ,max
u
l t l t  with 45, 5u u    for u 5.  
 
Figure 24.   Comparison between the values of , ,max
u





From Figure 24 it is observed that 45, 5
u
u   has the highest value within all the 
probability maps across the detection time horizon. The model returns a single estimate 
of the attack location and time – cell 45 at u = 5.  In addition, 45, 5
u
u   crosses the alarm 
threshold of 0.7 at u = 8. Hence the model is able to estimate accurately the attack 
location and time within 3 minutes of the attack. 
5. Simulation Results for Test Case 3, Attack at Location 48 
For an attack at cell 48, the ENCS is 2, from a single sensor at cell 50. The 
statistics of the five simulation runs are summarized in Table 19. 
 
Table 19.   Simulated sensor signals and model outputs for pre-screening test case 3 
 Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4 Run 5 
Simulated signal returns 
Number signals from sensor 
deployed 4 10 4 3 6 
False positive errors 1 7 1 0 3 
False negative errors 0 0 0 0 0 
Correct signals 3 3 3 3 3 
Model outputs 
Estimate of attack location NA NA NA NA Cell 44 
Estimate of time of attack NA NA NA NA u = 13 
Location error (meters) NA NA NA NA 100  
Time of release error (mins) NA NA NA NA 8 
Time at which alarm threshold of 
0.7 is  crossed NA NA NA NA u = 15 
Highest posterior for the correct 
location and time, 48, 5
u
u uMax    0.446 0.431 0.446 0.494 0.446 
Time at which the highest value 
of the correct posterior is 
observed, 48, 5
u
u uArgMax    
u= 8 u = 8 u = 8 u = 20 u = 8 
Presence of incorrect posteriors  
> alarm threshold of 0.7 No No No No Yes 
Presence of incorrect posteriors  
> noise floor  of 0.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Is 48, 5 ,
u u
u l t      l, t, u?  No No No No No 
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a. Results and Discussions for Simulation Runs 1, 2 3, and 4 
For simulation runs 1, 2, 3, and 4, the model is able to estimate accurately 
the time and location of the attack, but fails to trigger an alarm as the likelihood observed 
is lower than the alarm threshold of 0.7. This is due to the presence of a false estimate of 
an attack at cell 47 that presumably occurred at time at u = 4.  
For discussion purposes, we present the results for simulation run #4 
where there are no false positive and false negative errors in the simulated return signals. 
Figure 25 compares the posterior probabilities of the correct event, 48, 5
u
u   with the 
posterior probabilities of the false event,  47, 4
u
u    and , ,max ul t l t    for u 5 for run #4 of 
the simulation for test case 3. 
 
Figure 25.   Comparison between the values of  , ,max
u
l t l t ,  47, 4
u
u   and 48, 5u u    for  u = 5 
for run #4 of the simulation for test case 3 
 
It can be seen the value of  47, 4
u
u    is slightly higher than the value of 
48, 5
u
u    and is equal to the value of , ,max ul t l t  over the detection time horizon. It is 
important to note that in run #4 there are no false positive and false negative errors in the 
simulated return signals.  Hence the model is unable to differentiate between an attack at 
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cell 48 at u = 5 and an attack at cell 47 at u = 4 with just 3 signal returns from the single 
sensor at cell 50. This can be explained by the 50,l tP  values for these attacks in Table 20. 
 
Table 20.   50,l tP  values for sensor 50 for attacks at location cell 47 and cell 48 
50
,l tP  Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical 
attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
47 0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 
48 0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
As seen from Table 20, when 3 consecutive alarms are received from 
sensor 50 at u = 6 till u = 8, the Bayesian updating model will increase  47, 4
u
u   and 
48, 5
u
u  . Hence given only signal returns from a single sensor, the model is unable to 
differentiate between the two attacks. The consolation is that in such an event, the 
probability map will show only 2 competing estimates with a spatial difference of 100m 
and a temporal difference of 1 minute. Figure 26 shows the contour plot of the probability 
map at u = 8, for simulation run 4. 


























Attack at cell 47 at u=4
Posterior probability = 0.491
Attack at cell 48 at u=5
Posterior probability = 0.446
 
Figure 26.   Contour plot of the probability map at u = 8 for simulation run 4 of test case 3 
 
It is important to note that the competition between the two attack events 
lowers their posterior probability as the model is conditioned on the event of at most a 
single attack. Hence the alarm threshold of 0.7 cannot be met. Competing events cannot 
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be resolved by the model when limited information is available to differentiate between 
them. To resolve competing events, updates of the events are needed from sensors 
located at different locations. To overcome this, one possible approach is to sum the 
posterior probabilities of attack events that have attack locations adjacent to each other 
with respect to the prevailing wind direction and whose times of attacks are one minute 
apart. This will allow the collective estimate to meet the alarm criterion, giving two 
estimates with a spatial difference of 100m and a temporal difference of 1 minute. 
However in this thesis, this approach is not implemented. 
b. Results and Discussions for Simulation Run 5 
For simulation run #5, a total of six correct signals are received from the 
16 sensors in the field. Three false positives are encountered in this simulation run. The 
respective times of the signals (indicated by 1) and the corresponding sensors that 
produced them are shown in Table 21. 
 
Table 21.   Simulated signal returns for run #5 of pre-screening  test case 3 
  Location of sensor 
Detection 
time 
horizon(u) 1 10 14 17 33 38 41 45 50 56 63 68 84 87 91 100
0 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
1 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
2 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
3 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
4 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
5 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
6 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
7 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
8 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
9 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
10 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
11 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
12 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
13 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
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14 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
15 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0  0  0  0
16 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
17 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
18 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0  0  0
19 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
20 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
 
For simulation run #5, the alarm threshold is crossed for an attack at 
location cell 44 at u = 13, that is  1544,2  0.7. However the likelihood of this attack drops 
drastically in the next update to a value of 0.27.  Figure 27 plots the values of 44, 13
u
u   ,  
47, 4
u
u  , 48, 5u u  , and , ,max ul t l t  for u  5. 
 
Figure 27.   Values of 44, 13
u
u   ,  47, 4u u  , 48, 5u u  , and , ,max ul t l t  for u 5. 
 
From Figure 27, it can be seen that similar to simulation runs 1, 2, 3, and 4 
the model is unable to resolve the competing events of an attack at cell 47 at u = 4 and an 
attack at cell 48 at u = 5. However the posterior probabilities of these two events start to 




event is due to a false signal from the sensor at cell 45 at u = 14 followed by a false signal 
from the sensor at cell 56 at u = 15. This is evident from the 44,
s
tP  values of sensor 45 and 
sensor 56 in Table 22.  
 
Table 22.   44,
s
tP  values for sensor 45 and 56 for attacks at location cell 44 
 
 45,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical 
attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
44 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
56
,l tP   Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical 
attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
44 0.01 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
However in the absence of further signal returns that support the 
occurrence of the third event, its posterior probability drops drastically in the next update 
at u = 16 to a value of 0.27. Hence the third event produces a peak that crosses the alarm 
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Peak for an attack for location 44 at u=14
 
Figure 28.   Probability maps for simulation run #5 at u = 15 and u = 16 
 
In simulation run #5, the number of false positive and false negative 
signals is lower than that of run #2 which did not produce a false estimate. Yet a false 
estimate is made with a strong possibility of 0.77. Hence the accuracy the model is 
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affected not only by the number of false positives but also significantly by the time and 
place of their occurrence. If the false positives collectively form a pattern that mimics the 
possible occurrence of a chemical attack, the model will provide an estimate of the false 
attack. We suspect such an occurrence is rare as false positives are random in nature. Still 
this can be overcome with a more stringent requirement such as the need for consecutive 
posterior probabilities that cross the alarm threshold before an alarm is set off. 
6. Simulation Results for Test Case 4, Attack at Location 51 
For an attack at cell 51, the ENCS is 18, from five different sensors. The statistics 
of the five simulation runs are summarized in Table 23. 
 
Table 23.   Simulated sensor signals and model outputs for pre-screening test case 4 
 Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4 Run 5 
Simulated signal returns 
Number signals from sensor 
deployed 21 21 20 22 24 
False positive errors 1 1 2 3 5 
False negative errors 1 1 3 2 2 
Correct signals 20 20 18 19 19 
Model outputs 
Estimate of attack location Cell 51 Cell 51 Cell 51 Cell 51 Cell 51 
Estimate of time of attack u = 5 u = 5 u = 5 u = 5 u = 5 
Location error (meters) 0 0 0 0 0 
Time of release error (mins) 0 0 0 0 0 
Time at which alarm threshold of 
0.7 is  crossed u = 9 u = 11 u = 10 u = 10 u = 10 
Highest posterior for the correct 
location and time, 51, 5
u
u uMax    1 1 0.998 0.999 1 
Time at which the highest value 
of the correct posterior is 
observed, 51, 5
u
u uArgMax    
u = 12 u = 12 u = 13 u = 14  u = 13 
Presence of incorrect posteriors  
> alarm threshold of 0.7 No No Yes No No 
Presence of  incorrect posteriors  
> noise floor  of 0.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Is 51, 5 ,
u u
u l t      l, t, u?    No No No No No 
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The model is able to estimate the time and location of the attack accurately for all 
five runs despite the presence of false positive and false negative errors. For discussion 
purposes we present the results for simulation run #1 and run #3. 
a. Results and Discussions for Simulation Run 1 
For simulation run #1, a total of 21 signals are received. One false positive 
error and one false negative error are encountered in this simulation run. The respective 
times of the signals and the corresponding sensors that produced them are shown in Table 
24. 
 
Table 24.   Simulated signal returns for run 1 of pre-screening  test case 4 
  Location of sensor 
Detection 
time 
horizon(u) 1 10 14 17 33 38 41 45 50 56 63 68 84 87 91 100
0 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
1 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
2 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
3 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
4 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
5 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
6 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
7 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
8 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0  0  0  0
9 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0  0  0  0
10 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0  0  0  0
11 0  0  0  0  0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0  0  0  0
12 0  0  0  0  0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0  0  0  0
13 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0  0  0  0
14 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0  0  0  0
15 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  0  0  1
16 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
17 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
18 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
19 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
20 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
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For run #1, the probability map at u = 8, shows two probable events of an 
attack: cell 53 at u = 6 with 853,2 = 0.39, and cell 52 at u = 5 with  852,3 = 0.43. Figure 29 
depicts the probability map at u  =  8.  








Probability map at u= 8

















Attack at cell 53 at u = 6
Posterior probability = 0.393




Figure 29.   Probability map at  u = 8, for simulation run #1 of test case 4 
 
However at  u  =  9,  the posterior probabilities of both events, an attack at 
cell 53 at u = 6 and cell 52 at u = 5, drop drastically. The model returns only a single 
estimate, an attack at cell 51 at u = 5 with a posterior probability of 0.72 which crosses 
the alarm threshold. For the rest of the simulation, the posterior probability of this correct 
estimate continues to increase and remain the dominant peak within the probability maps. 
Figure 30 depicts the probability map at u = 9.  
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Probability map at u=9






















Attack at cell 51 at u = 5
Posterior Probability = 0.723
 
Figure 30.   Probability map at  u = 9 for simulation run #1 of test case 4 
 
Figure 31 plots the values of 53, 6
u
u  , 52, 5u u  ,  51, 5u u    and , ,max ul t l t  for  u 
  5. It can be seen that the posterior probabilities of an attack at cell 53 at u = 6 and cell 
52 u = 5 are dominant in the probability map only at the u = 8 update.  Thereafter their 
probabilities drop below the noise floor of the model. The correct estimate of an attack at 
cell 51 at u = 5 remains the dominant estimate during the entire simulation run. 
 
Figure 31.   Plot of the values of 53, 6
u




To understand the transient spikes in the values of 53, 6
u
u   and 52, 5u u   , we 
observe from Table 25 that at u = 8, 4551,3P , 
45
52,3P , and 
45




52,3P   and  
56
53,2P  . Hence the signals given by the sensors located at 45 and 56 at       
u = 8 generate high posterior probabilities for an attack in these three locations. 
 
Table 25.   Expected pattern of sensor responses for an attack at (i) cell 51 at u = 5 (ii) 
cell 52 at u = 5 and (iii) cell 53 at u = 6 
  Attack at cell 51 at u = 5 
Detection time  horizon u Sensor 
  38 45 50 56 68 
5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
7 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
8 0.01 0.6 0.01 0.5 0.01 
9 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.8 0.01 
10 0.01 0.6 0.01 0.9 0.5 
11 0.5 0.01 0.01 0.8 0.7 
12 0.6 0.01 0.6 0.5 0.8 
13 0.5 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.7 
14 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.5 
15 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.01 
16 0.01 0.01 0.6 0.01 0.01 
  Attack at cell 52 at u = 5 
5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
7 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
8 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.7 0.01 
9 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.9 0.5 
10 0.5 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.7 
11 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.8 
12 0.5 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.7 
13 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.5 
14 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.01 
15 0.01 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.01 





Detection time  horizon u  Attack at cell 53 at u = 6 
5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
7 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
8 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.7 0.01 
9 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 0.01 
10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.6 
11 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.8 
12 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.6 
13 0.01 0.01 0.8 0.01 0.01 
14 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.01 
15 0.01 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.01 
16 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
At u = 9, once again simultaneous signals from the sensors in cell 45 and 
56 are received, which increase the posterior probability of an attack at cell 51 at u = 5, 
but reduce the posterior probabilities of an attack at cells 53 and 52 since                      
45 45
52,4 53,3 0.01P P  . In addition no signal is received from the sensor at cell 68 for which 
68
52,4P  = 0.5. The posterior probability of the correct estimate, 51, 5
u
u    continues to increase 
as the simulated signals match the expected response pattern of this attack with respect to 
the timing of the signals received as well as the sensors responsible for the signals.  
b. Results and Discussions for Simulation Run 3 
For simulation run 3, a total of 20 signals are received. Two false positive 
errors and two false negative errors are encountered in this simulation run. The respective 







Table 26.   Simulated signal returns for run #3 of pre-screening  test case 4 
  Location of sensor 
Detection 
time 
horizon(u) 1 10 14 17 33 38 41 45 50 56 63 68 84 87 91 100
0 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
1 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
2 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
3 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
4 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
5 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
6 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
7 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
8 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
9 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0  0  0  0
10 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0  0  0  0
11 0  0  0  0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  0  0  0
12 0  0  0  0  0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0  0  0  0
13 0  0  0  1  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0  0  0  0
14 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  0  0  0
15 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
16 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
17 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
18 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
19 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
20 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
 
For run #3, the probability map at u = 9 reveals an attack at location 43 at  
u = 6 with the value of  943,3  = 0.86 which crosses the alarm threshold. Figure 32 depicts 
the probability map at u  = 9. 
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Attack at location 43 at u = 6
Posterior probability = 0.86
 
Figure 32.   Probability map at  u = 9 for simulation run #3 of test case 4 
 
However at u = 10, the value of 1043,4   drops drastically to 0.09. The model 
returns only a single estimate, an attack at cell 51 at u = 5 with 1051,5  = 0.88 which crosses 
the alarm threshold. For the rest of the simulation, the posterior probability of this correct 
estimate continues to increase and remain the dominant peak within the probability maps. 
Figure 33 depicts the probability map at u = 10.  

























Attack at location 51 at u=5
Posterior probability = 0.88
 
Figure 33.   Probability map at  u = 10, for simulation run #3 of test case 4 
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It can be seen that the posterior probability of an attack at cell 43 at u = 6 
crosses the threshold only for the update at u = 10 and fades away thereafter. The 
posterior probability of an attack at cell 51 at u = 5 remains the dominant estimate for the 




Figure 34.   Plot of the values of 43, 6
u
u  ,   51, 5u u    and , ,max ul t l t  for  u   5 
 
Figure 34 plots the values of 43, 6
u
u  ,  51, 5u u    and , ,max ul t l t  for  u   5. It 
can be seen from Figure 35 that the value of 943,3   rises above the alarm threshold to 0.86 
at u = 9 due to a false positive error from sensor 50 and a false negative error from sensor 
56. At u = 10, simultaneous alarms are received from the sensors placed at cell 45, 56 and 
68. This increases the value of 51, 5
u
u   but decreases the value of 43, 6u u   since at u = 10,  
45 56 68
43,4 43,4 43,4 0.01P P P   . The posterior probability of the correct estimate, 51, 5u u    
continues to increase as the simulated signals match the expected response pattern of this 
attack with respect to timing of the signals received as well as the sensors responsible for 
the signals. 
Hence false negatives in conjunction with false positives can result in a 
wrong estimate that is very far in physical proximity from the true attack location. To 
overcome this, an additional requirement to trigger an alarm will be at least three 
consecutive observations that are above the alarm threshold.  This added more stringent 
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requirement for persistency should weed out transient spikes due to false negatives and 
false positive signals adding greater confidence and reliability in triggering an alarm. 
7. Simulation Results for Test Case 5, Attack at Location 85 
For an attack at cell 85, the ENCS is 2 from two different sensors.  The statistics 
of the five simulation runs are summarized in Table 27.  
 
Table 27.   Simulated sensor signals and model outputs for pre-screening test case 4 
 Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4 Run 5 
Simulated signal returns 
Number signals from sensor 
deployed 6 13 6 8 12 
False positive errors 0 7 1 3 6 
False negative errors 0 0 1 1 0 
Correct signals 6 6 4 5 6 
Model outputs 
Estimate of attack location Cell 85 Cell 85 Cell 85 Cell 85 Cell 85 
Estimate of time of attack u = 5 u = 5 u = 5 u = 5 u = 5 
Location error (meters) 0 0 0 0 0 
Time of release error (mins) 0 0 0 0 0 
Time at which alarm threshold of 
0.7 is  crossed u = 8 u = 8 u = 8 u = 8 u = 8 
Highest posterior for the correct 
location and time, 85, 5
u
u uMax    1 1 1 1 1 
Time at which the highest value 
of the correct posterior is 
observed, 85, 5
u
u uArgMax    
u = 12 u = 13 u = 13 u = 9 u = 12 
Presence of incorrect posteriors  
> alarm threshold of 0.7 
No No No No No 
 
Presence of incorrect posteriors  
> noise floor  of 0.2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Is 85, 5 ,
u u
u l t      l, t, u?   No No No No No 
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For all five simulation runs, the model is able to estimate accurately the attack 
location and time to be cell 85 at u = 5. We present only the results for simulation run #1. 
Figure 35 plots the values of 85, 5
u
u    and , ,max ul t l t  for u 5. 
 
Figure 35.   Plot of the values of 85, 5
u
u    and , ,max ul t l t  for u  5 
 
From Figure 35, it can be seen that the posterior probability of an attack at cell 85 
at u = 5 crosses the alarm threshold at the update at u = 8 and remains the sole dominant 
estimate for the entire simulation run. 
8. Insights Gained from the Preliminary Simulation Trials 
The preliminary trials helped to determine the alarm criterion for responding to an 
attack. The alarm criterion is at least three consecutive instances of posterior probabilities 
that are above the alarm threshold of 0.7. The alarm threshold is set at 0.7 to avoid 
responding to competing cues representing possible attack events early in the update 
process. The requirement for three consecutive observations eliminates false estimates 
caused by sudden spikes in the probability maps due to false positive errors and/or false 
negative errors that are encountered in the operational environment. 
The preliminary trials also revealed that the model requires signals from sensors 
located in at least two different locations to resolve between competing cues representing 
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possible attack events that are spatially and temporally close. This adds another constraint 
on top of other operational requirements in the deployment of sensors such as early 
warning and detection coverage of the area of operations.  
Factors that affect the model’s capability to accurately estimate the location and 
time of an attack are (i) the Expected Number of Correct Signals (ENCS) (ii) the number 
of false positive errors and (iii) the number of false negative errors. 
Implementing the alarm criterion stated, Table 28 summarizes the model 
performance statistic for the preliminary trials. If we exclude the runs for an attack at 
location 48 where the model is unable to resolve between 2 competing events, the 
percentage success will be 100% instead.   
 
Table 28.   Overall statistics of the preliminary  trials 
Total number of runs 20 
Average number of false positives 2.55 
Average number of false negatives 0.7 
Average number of correct signals 8.65 
Number of runs with correct estimates 15 
Percentage success   75 
Average time taken to sound an alarm (mins) 6 
 
C.  TEST DESIGN MATRIX 
Screening experiments are used to estimate the magnitude and direction of factor 
effects; that is how much does the response variable change when each factor is changed 
(Montgomery, 2009).  
Factors that affect the model’s capability to accurately estimate the location and 
time of an attack given a (i) sensor deployment plan, (ii) set of meteorological conditions 
and (iii) chemical attack quantity are  
(i) Expected Number of Correct Signals (ENCS) 
(ii) Number of false positive errors 
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(iii) Number of false negative errors 
The relationship between the factors identified and the model input parameters are 
summarized in Table 29.  
 
Table 29.   Relationship between the factors and model input parameters 
Factors Model Input parameters 
1) ENCS  Location of attack 
2) Number of false positive errors 1 q , false positive probability 
3) Number of false negative errors Sensitivity of the sensor being modeled 
 
To evaluate the model we categorize the three factors. With respect to the ENCS, 
the attack locations are divided into 3 categories, each corresponding to low, medium and 
high values of ENCS, as shown in Table 30. In the evaluation trials, an attack location is 
randomly selected from each of the three categories. We require however that each attack 
location is covered by at least two sensors. This is to ensure that the model is able to 
resolve between competing cues representing possible attack events that are close to each 
other spatially and temporally. 
 
Table 30.   Categories of ENCS 
 ENCS categories 
  Low  Medium  High 
ENCS less than 6 6 to 10 More than 10 
Number of locations within category 38 18 13 
 
 
We consider two categories for the error rates: high and low. A low false positive 
rate is 10 errors in an hour from all 16 sensors, which implies 1 q  = 0.0104. A high 
false positive rate is 30 errors in an hour from all 16 sensors, which implies                
1 q  = 0.03125. For the false negative errors we consider the following two sensor 
models: 









0.9 7.5 / 30 /
0.8 2 / 7.5 /
( ) 0.7 0.5 / 2 /
0.6 0.125 / 0.5 /
0.5 0.01 / Detection threshold
1 .
I
if c mg m
if c mg m and mg m
if c mg m and mg m
P c if c mg m and mg m
if c mg m and mg m
if c mg m
q otherwise
            
 






0.9 0.5 / 2 /
( ) 0.8 0.125 / 0.5 /
0.7 0.01 / 0.125 /
1
II
if c mg m
if c mg m and mg m
P c if c mg m and mg m
if c mg m and mg m
q otherwise
        
 
The chemical attack involves 50kg of Sarin, which is a nerve agent. The alarm 
criterion is at least three consecutive time periods in which the posterior probability of a 
certain entry in the probability map is above the alarm threshold 0.7. We recognize that 
other alarm criteria such as two consecutive observations that are above the alarm 
threshold of 0.8 may also be applicable. In evaluating the model, the emphasis is not on 
determining an optimal alarm criterion, as this is dependent on the risk attitude and 
objectives of the decision maker. Recall that the MOEs used in evaluating the model are: 
a) Accurately identifying the attack location 
b) Accurately identifying the time of attack 
We design a screening experiment with input factors (ENCS, false positive errors, 
and false negative errors). The experimental design matrix, which is a full factorial in the 
three factors defined, consists of 300 simulation trials. There are 12 test cases, with 25 
replications per test case. This matrix is shown in Table 31.  A test case (or single 
experiment) is defined by the levels of ENCS (three categories) and the levels of false 
positive and false negative errors (two categories each). A full factorial will allow us to 
screen for all main effects and two factor interactions in the variables of interest.  
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Table 31.   Experimental design matrix 














High false negatives 25  25   25   25    25  25   
Low false negatives 25   25   25   25    25  25   
 
D.  EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION 
In this section we present the results of the simulation runs for the 12 test cases, 
develop a linear regression model for identifying the effects of the factors on the MOEs 
and discuss the results obtained.  
1. Evaluation of Test Results 
It is observed that in most instances the alarm criterion successfully ignores false 
estimates caused by sudden spikes in the probability maps due to false positive errors and 
false negative signals. False estimates that satisfy the alarm criterion deviate substantially 
from the actual location and time of the attack. As the accuracy of both the time and 
location of the attack is critical, a success is only declared if both MOEs are satisfied.   
We define success percentage as 
  
and use this measure for evaluating the results of the simulations. Note that success 
percentage is only defined on the range 0 to 100. As a result of this, it would be ideal to 
fit the response with a logistic model. However, in this section, we are concerned with 
identifying the important factors and determining the magnitude and direction of their 
effect on the response, success percentage, rather than create a fitted model to use a 
predictor.  
Myers et al., (2002) point out that a factorial design can be used to effectively 
identify significant factors through a linear fit, even if the response is logistic. The linear 
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model should not however be used for making adequate predictions. After the significant 
factors are identified, follow on experiments could be preformed and used for fitting a 
logistic model.  
The success percentage values for the 12 test cases are presented in Table 32. 
 
Table 32.   Success percentage for the 12 test cases  














High false negatives 68 88 52 72 24 44 
Low false negatives 92 96 84 88 52 80 
 
From Table 32, it is observed that the success percentage increases with high 
levels of ENCS, decreases with high levels of false positive errors and high levels of false 
negative errors. In the presence of low false positive errors and low false negative errors, 
the success percentage is    80%. Next, we develop a linear regression model to assess 
the effect of each one of the three factors on the success percentage.  
2. Linear Regression Model 
In a screening experiment, a linear regression model is often used to identify the 
significant factors from an experiment. We use a linear regression model to investigate 
the effect of the factors on the success percentage. The full model is: 
 Y  0  1x1  2x2  3x3  12x1x2  13x1x3  23x2x3   ,  
where 
 Y :    represents the success percentage; 
 1x :  represents false positive rates, 11 1x    in coded units, with 1x  = 1 
indicating high false positives rates and 1x  = 1 low false positives rates; 
2x :  represents false negative rates, 21 1x    in coded units, with 2x  = 1 
indicating high false positives rates and 2x  = 1 low false positives rates; 
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3x  :  represents ENCS, 31 1x    in coded units, with 3x  = 1 indicating high 
ENCS, 3x  = 0 medium ENCS and 3x   =  1 low ENCS; and  
ε :  represents noise, taken to be independent identically distributed Normal 
random variates.  
The results of the linear regression, fitted using Minitab, indicate that only the 
main effects (ENCS, false positive errors, false negative errors) are significant and no 
two factor interactions are statistically significant. The estimated linear model in coded 
units takes the form  

1 2 370 8 12 18 (8)Y x x x      
The corresponding statistics of the linear model are shown in Table 33 and the 
normal probability plot of the residuals is shown in Figure 36. 
 
Table 33.   Statistics of the linear model  
Estimator value Standard error t-statistic p-value 
0  70.000 2.198 31.84 0.000 
1  8.000 2.198 3.64 0.007 
2  12.000 2.198 5.46 0.001 























(response is Percentage Success)
 
Figure 36.   Normal probability plot of percentage success against residuals 
 
As seen from Table 33, the p-value of each the regressors is less than 0.05. The R2 
value of the linear model is 91.6% and the R2 adjusted is 88.5%. The linear model 
provides an adequate fit to the data for its intended purpose of identifying significant 
factors and demonstrating the magnitude and direction those effects. 
Other adequacy checks such as the plot of residuals against the fitted value and 
residual vs. run order indicate a possible slight violation of the constant variance 
assumption. As a result a transformation was applied to the response in order to stabilize 
the variance. This transformation resulted in no changes in conclusions about the main 
factor effects and their magnitude or direction.  
3. Discussion 
Clearly, the best test-case situation is when the value of ENCS is high and the 
rates of false positive and false negative errors are low. The worst-test case situation is 
when the value of ENCS is low and the rates of false positive and false negative errors 
are high. For the best-test case situation, success percentage is 96%. For the worst-test 
case situation, success percentage is only 24%. 
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From the linear regression model, it is found that with all other factors held at 
their nominal levels the success percentage (i) increases by 18% when the ENCS is 
increased from low levels of ENCS to high levels of ENCS, (ii) decreases by 8% when 
false positive rate is tripled from 0.0104 to 0.03125 and (iii) decreases by 12% when the 
false negative rate is doubled from 0.0045 to 0.009. From the regression equation in (8), 
we observe that the dominant factor is the ENCS with the highest coefficient value of 18. 
As a result, in sensor placement, considerations should be made to increase the ENCS for 
sensors in the area of operations. We also observe that the false negative errors have a 
higher impact on the success percentage than the false positive errors.  
Note that placing all of the factors at their high levels results in a greater than 100 
percent success rate based on the fitted modeling in equation (8). This result is clearly 
impossible. While the fitted linear model was able to provide insight as to the main 
effects and their relative importance, follow on experiments and the use of a fitted 
logistic model would be needed to make more precise predictions.  
E.  INSIGHTS ON SENSOR COVERAGE 
The ,
s
l tP  values derived from the output of the physical and sensor model give the 
probability that a sensor located at location s will detect a chemical attack at location l, t 
time periods ago. These values also give the coverage of a given sensor deployment 
plan..   
Figure 37 shows the coverage of the sensor deployment plan used in the large 
scale setting for a 50kg nerve agent attack with a wind speed of 1.67m/s blowing to the 
east. The lightly shaded area cells contain sensors while the darkly shaded area cells 

















Figure 37.   Sensor coverage for a 50kg nerve agent attack 
 
From Figure 37, it can be seen that an attack originating in any of the 18 darkly 
shaded area cells will not be detected by any of the sensors in the current deployment 
plan, given the meteorological conditions. A plume originating in these cells will drift 
eastward without encountering any sensors. 
We take it a step further to give a coverage index to each area cell. This index, l , 
is the probability that an attack in cell l is correctly detected by at least one sensor. 
Assuming stationary detection capability of the sensors and independence between sensor 
signals,  l  is calculated as follows: 
,
,
1 (1 ) (9)sl l t
t s
P     
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 





The value of l  increases with the ENCS since the product term in Equation 9 is 
dependent on the ENCS. Hence area cells that have a high value of ENCS also have a 
high value of l .   
Figure 38 shows the values of the coverage index of the sensor deployment plan 
used in the large scale setting for a 50kg nerve agent attack with a wind speed of 1.67m/s 
in the eastern direction. The lightly shaded area cells contain sensors.  
From Figure 38, the coverage index informs decision makers and planners on the 
probability of detecting a chemical attack relative to a sensor deployment plan. With the 
coverage index, vulnerable locations (locations with low probability of detection) as well 
as locations with no coverage are identified. 
Chemical sensors placed downwind of the area of operations give better coverage 
at the expense of delayed warning. This is a tradeoff that decision makers have to make 
in sensor placement. The detection of a chemical attack depends on the location, quantity 
and type of chemical agent used as well as the prevailing meteorological conditions 
relative to the sensor deployment plan and the detection performance of the sensors. The 
,
s
l tP  values offer an important tool to provide decision makers information on the 
coverage of a sensor deployment plan. The coverage index allows decision makers and 
planners to identify both vulnerable areas and areas with no sensor coverage. This allows 
gaps to be identified and improvements to be made by adding sensors or redeploying 


















































































































































































































Figure 38.   Values of the coverage index for a 50kg nerve agent attack by cell location 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A Bayesian updating model is used to detect a chemical attack, determine its 
location l and estimate the time of the attack t. The model uses data obtained from 
sensors deployed in the area of operations monitoring the air for a possible chemical 
attack. The detection model is made up of 3 modules: (i) a physical model; (ii) a sensor 
model; and (iii) a Bayesian updating model. 
The physical model serves to calculate the chemical concentration c at the 
location of sensor s due to an attack at location l, t time periods ago. Based on the output 
c of the physical model, the sensor model computes the probabilities, ,
s
l tP . The Bayesian 
updating model calculates the probability map at time period u, ,
u
l t  , of the posterior 
probability of a chemical attack at location l, t time period ago after the observations 
obtained by the sensors at time u. High value of ,
u
l t  at time period u , indicates that there 
is a strong likelihood that a chemical attack has occurred at location l, t time periods ago. 
The model is evaluated with respect to settings representing real-world 
operations. The selected alarm criterion by which decision makers initiate a response is at 
least three consecutive instances of posterior probabilities of an attack at location l, t time 
periods ago that is above the alarm threshold of 0.7. The alarm threshold is set at 0.7 to 
avoid responding to competing cues representing possible attack events early in the 
update process. The requirement for three consecutive observations eliminates false 
estimates caused by sudden spikes in the probability maps due to false positive errors 
and/or false negative errors that are encountered in the operational environment. 
Factors that affect the model’s capability to accurately estimate the location and 
time of an attack are (i) the specific layout of the deployed sensors relative to the attack 
location; (ii) the number of false positive errors; and (iii) the number of false negative 
errors. 
From the linear regression model, it is found that, of the factors studied, the 
dominant factor is the ENCS, which depends on the specific layout of the deployed 
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sensors relative to the attack location. As a result, in sensor placement, considerations 
should be made to increase the ENCS for sensors in the area of operations. In the battle 
between sensitivity and specificity of the sensors deployed, it is more worthwhile to 
invest in sensitivity. This is because false negative rates are found to affect the model 
performance to a greater extent. 
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that the model developed is able, in many 
cases, to accurately identify the location and time of a chemical attack with a nominal 
attack quantity of 50kg using inputs from chemical sensors and ATD models. The model 
bridges a critical gap between raw sensor data and threat evaluation and prediction 
models, giving authorities the capability to perform better hazard detection and damage 
control.  
Insights on sensor coverage were also obtained. By using the ,
s
l tP   values of all the 
point sensors deployed, the coverage of the sensors for a given chemical attack quantity 
and set of meteorological conditions can be ascertained. The ,
s
l tP  values offer an 
important tool to provide decision makers information on the coverage of a sensor 
deployment plan. A coverage index indicating the probability of detecting a chemical 
attack relative to a sensor deployment plan was also developed. The coverage index 
allows decision makers and planners to identify both vulnerable areas and areas with no 
sensor coverage. This allows coverage gaps to be identified and improvements to be 
made by the addition of sensors or redeploying forward sensors downwind at the expense 
of early warning. 
Future research involves extending the model to (i) detect chemical attacks with 
different nominal attack quantity levels, (ii) detect multiple chemical attacks and (iii) 
incorporate different sensor types. The insights obtained on sensor coverage through the 
use of the ,
s
l tP   values in the model motivate further research in the area of sensor 






l tP  VALUES OF ALL 16 SENSORS FOR A NERVE AGENT ATTACK 
Table 34.   1,l tP  values for sensor in cell 1 
 
1
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
2 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
100 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
Table 35.   10,l tP  values for sensor in cell 10 
 
10
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 
2 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
3 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
4 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
5 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
6 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
7 
0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
8 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
9 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
10 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
11 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
12 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
13 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
14 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
15 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
16 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
17 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
18 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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19 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
20 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
21 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
22 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
23 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
24 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
25 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
26 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
99 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
100 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
Table 36.   14,l tP  values for sensor in cell 14 
 
14
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
2 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
3 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
11 
0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
12 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
13 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
14 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
15 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
21 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
22 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
23 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
100 






Table 37.   17,l tP  values for sensor in cell 17 
 
17
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
2 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
3 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
4 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
5 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
6 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
7 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
8 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
9 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
10 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
11 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
12 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
13 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
14 
0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
15 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
16 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
17 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
18 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
19 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
20 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
21 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
22 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
23 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
24 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
25 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
26 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
31 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
32 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
33 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
100 




Table 38.   33,l tP  values for sensor in cell 33 
 
33
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
2 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
21 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
22 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
23 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
24 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
25 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
26 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
27 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
28 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
29 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
30 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
31 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
32 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
33 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
34 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
35 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
36 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
37 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
38 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
39 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
40 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
41 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
42 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
43 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
100 






Table 39.   38,l tP  values for sensor in cell 38 
 
38
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
2 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
11 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
12 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
13 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
14 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
15 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
21 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
22 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
23 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
24 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
25 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
26 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
27 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
28 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
29 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
30 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
31 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
32 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
33 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
34 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
35 
0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
36 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
37 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
38 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
39 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
40 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
41 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
42 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
43 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
44 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 88
45 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
46 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
47 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
48 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
49 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
50 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
51 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
52 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
53 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
99 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
100 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
Table 40.   41,l tP values for sensor in cell 41 
 
41
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
41 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
42 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
100 






Table 41.   45,l tP  values for sensor in cell 45 
 
45
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
31 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
32 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
33 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
34 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
35 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
36 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
37 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
38 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
39 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
40 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
41 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
42 
0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
43 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
44 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
45 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
46 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
47 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
48 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
49 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
50 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
51 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
52 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
53 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
54 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
100 




Table 42.   50,l tP  values for sensor in cell 50 
 
50
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
21 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
22 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
23 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
24 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
25 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
26 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
27 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
28 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
29 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
30 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
31 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
32 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
33 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
34 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
35 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
36 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
37 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
38 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
39 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
40 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
41 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 
42 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
43 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
44 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
45 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
46 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
47 
0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
48 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
49 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
50 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
51 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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52 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
53 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
54 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
55 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
56 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
57 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
58 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
59 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
60 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
61 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
62 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
63 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
64 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
65 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
66 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
67 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
68 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
69 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
70 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
100 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
Table 43.   56,l tP  values for sensor in cell 56 
 
56
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
31 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
32 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
41 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
42 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
43 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
44 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
45 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
46 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
47 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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48 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
49 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
50 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
51 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
52 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
53 
0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
54 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
55 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
56 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
57 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
58 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
59 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
60 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
61 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
62 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
63 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
64 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
65 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
66 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
67 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
68 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
69 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
70 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
71 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
72 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
100 







Table 44.   63,l tP  values for sensor in cell 63 
 
63
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
51 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
52 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
53 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
54 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
55 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
56 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
57 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
58 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
59 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
60 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
61 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
62 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
63 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
64 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
65 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
66 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
67 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
68 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
69 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
70 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
71 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
72 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
100 





Table 45.   68,l tP  values for sensor in cell 68 
 
68
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
41 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
42 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
43 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
44 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
45 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
46 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
47 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
48 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
49 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
50 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
51 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
52 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
53 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
54 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
55 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
56 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
57 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
58 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
59 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
60 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
61 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
62 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
63 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
64 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
65 
0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
66 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
67 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
68 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
69 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
70 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
71 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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72 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
73 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
74 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
75 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
76 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
77 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
78 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
79 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
80 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
81 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
82 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
83 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
84 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
100 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
Table 46.   84,l tP  values for sensor in cell 84 
 
83
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
71 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
72 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
73 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
74 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
75 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
76 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
77 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
78 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
79 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
80 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
81 
0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
82 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
83 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
84 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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85 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
86 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
87 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
88 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
89 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
90 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
91 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
92 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
93 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
100 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
Table 47.   87,l tP  values for sensor in cell 87 
 
87
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
61 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
62 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
63 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
64 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
65 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
66 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
67 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
68 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
69 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
70 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
71 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
72 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
73 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
74 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
75 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
76 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
77 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
78 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
79 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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80 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
81 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
82 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
83 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
84 
0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
85 
0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
86 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
87 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
88 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
89 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
90 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
91 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
92 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
93 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
94 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
95 
0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
96 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
97 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
98 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
99 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
100 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
Table 48.   91,l tP  values for sensor in cell 91 
91
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
91 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
92 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
                                  
100 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Table 49.   100,l tP  values for sensor in cell 100 
 
100
,l tP  
Attack time scale, t time steps since the occurrence of the chemical attack 
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
61 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
62 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                  
71 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
72 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
73 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
74 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
75 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
76 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
77 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
78 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
79 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
80 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
81 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
82 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
83 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
84 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
85 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
86 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
87 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
88 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
89 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
90 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
91 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 
92 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
93 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
94 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
95 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
96 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
97 0.01 0.01 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
98 0.01 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
99 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
100 
1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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